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Summary 
Automated vehicles require a central decision unit in order to coordinate the responsi-
bility for the driving task between multiple operating modes. Additionally, other non-
driving related tasks such as operation of an automatic door system must be coordi-
nated as well. In this paper, we will motivate the usefulness of such a central decision 
unit at the example of the operating mode management of the UNICARagil project. We 
will describe its integration with UNICARagil’s Automotive Service-oriented Software 
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Architecture and how modularity of this service-oriented software architecture is en-
sured. An example from the project’s context will further illustrate the functioning prin-
ciple of the operating mode management in combination with the service orchestration 
of the Automotive Service-oriented Software Architecture.  
1 Introduction 
The automated vehicles developed in the project UNICARagil can be operated in four 
different operating modes: automated operation, control center operation, safe halt, 
and manual operation [1]. In automated operation mode, which is the default mode of 
the vehicles, the vehicles are supposed to handle all traffic situations and challenges 
that occur in operation. Control center operation is a fallback solution in the event that 
the automated vehicle guidance system is unable to resolve a situation on its own that 
has occurred in the open world. Safe halt is a fallback solution to cope with severe 
degradation and initiate a transition into a minimal risk condition [2]. Manual operation 
is only enabled for maneuvering the vehicle at very low speeds, e.g., in a vehicle repair 
shop. 
An automated vehicle with several different operating modes requires a central deci-
sion unit to coordinate mode changes. Any mode transition requires a set of conditions 
to be fulfilled. For example, the mode automated operation must not be activated when 
necessary components are not available. Software components in the UNICARagil ve-
hicles are realized as services as the UNICARagil vehicles feature the Automotive Ser-
vice-oriented Software Architecture (ASOA) [3], including a service orchestration. This 
service orchestration has the ability to start and stop services and to connect service 
interfaces. This approach allows for a reconfiguration of the set of active services with-
out losing the benefit of modularity of a service-based software architecture. Each op-
erating mode requires a specific configuration of services. The operating mode 
management interacts with the ASOA’s service orchestration. Services are kept una-
ware of the vehicle’s operating mode and are activated or deactivated by the ASOA’s 
Orchestrator depending on the current operating mode. 
As stated above, one main task of such an operating mode management is to coordi-
nate the responsibility regarding the interfacing with actuation systems performing the 
driving task. Additionally, tasks unrelated to the driving task itself must also be coordi-
nated in a fully automated vehicle. Examples for non-driving related tasks are opening 
the vehicle’s automatic doors, calling the control center, or activating and deactivating 
the lights. In a manually operated car, the driver is responsible that the vehicle’s doors 
are not opened while driving or when only stopping temporarily (e.g., at a red traffic 
light). In an automated vehicle, on the other hand, it is the vehicle’s responsibility that 
the doors are only opened at appropriate stops. 
Thus, a central decision unit like an operating mode management in an automated 
vehicle has two main tasks: to coordinate the responsibility for the driving task using 
operating mode changes and to coordinate non-driving related tasks. 
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In this contribution, after a brief overview of related work regarding operating mode 
management systems, we present the role of the different operating modes in 
UNICARagil’s ASOA and the project’s automation concepts. Following, we will present 
in detail the operating modes and the interaction with the ASOA's service Orchestrator 
and illustrate their interaction at an example. This paper serves as an initial overview 
of the approach the authors currently develop in the project. It depicts an early stage 
of development and shall be built upon in future publications.  
2 Related Work 
As soon as a mobile agent offers diverse control options, a concept for distinguishing 
and managing operating modes becomes necessary. A rigorous analysis of the state 
of the art has not yet accomplished. At the moment, we only refer to selected previous 
work from different fields of application which describe mode transitions between au-
tomated operation and teleoperation of the agent. For example, the fundamental need 
for a control mode manager to coordinate between remote and automatic control of 
robots, as well as an illustration of architectural consequences, can already be found 
in [4], where the concept of remote robot teleoperation is discussed. 
Bodell and Gulliksson [5] describe the design and simulation of a system for teleoper-
ation of an autonomous heavy duty truck. The remote control of the vehicle includes 
following pre-planned paths autonomously in addition to being controlled by a human. 
The authors design their system to allow for spontaneous human operator takeover at 
any time by performing Autonomous Synchronization with a System Coordinator node 
that is part of the control center’s system architecture. In Fig. 1, Bodell and Gulliksson 
illustrate the modes of operation for the system under development. Autonomous Safe 
(AS) is the automated navigation, Manual Safe (MS) is the operating mode of teleoper-
ation with an automatic emergency braking system being active, and Manual Unsafe 
(MU) is the operating mode of teleoperation with overridden emergency braking sys-
tem (e.g., to cope with sensor malfunction). 
 
Fig. 1 Control modes and autonomous synchronization by Bodell and Gulliksson 
with modes: Autonomous Safe (AS), Manual Safe (MS), Manual Unsafe 
(MU), Autonomous Unsafe (AU). ([5], p.40).
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In the context of urban search and rescue robots that allow for both autonomous and 
teleoperated navigation, Bruemmer et al. [6] introduce four modes of operation that 
allow their robot to adjust its level of autonomy on the fly: Teleoperation, Safe Mode, 
Shared Control, and Full Autonomy. A more detailed system description, which also 
addresses ergonomic aspects, can be found in [7]. However, the authors do not share 
details on their system’s mechanisms for operating mode management. 
Further related work on the subject of operating mode management describes systems 
based on conventional, manually controlled land vehicles. One example is the work of 
Appelqvist et al. [8] in which a common all-terrain vehicle is the basis of a demonstrator 
for military unmanned ground vehicle applications. The state-machine presented by 
the authors, which we show in Fig. 2, accordingly assumes a basic state of manual 
vehicle guidance and human supervision, which significantly limits its applicability to 
the UNICARagil research project. 
 
Fig. 2 Driving computer state machine ([8], p. 250). 
3 Role of operating modes in ASOA 
The software running in the UNICARagil vehicles uses the Automotive Service-ori-
ented Software Architecture (ASOA) [3]. We will now give a brief overview of ASOA 
and explain the role of the operating mode management in the context of ASOA.  
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To understand the relevance of various concepts in ASOA, we will first describe prev-
alent architectures in today’s production vehicles. During the vehicle engineering pro-
cess, dozens of subsystems – often provided by numerous suppliers – are integrated 
to constitute the final vehicle. The integration often occurs at an electronic control unit 
(ECU) level and many subsystems often come with their own custom-tailored ECU. 
During the design time, the resulting architectures are rigidly integrated and are not 
expected to change significantly after the design process. More specifically, the inter-
play between different ECUs and their software components is fixed and typically does 
not change for the lifetime of the vehicle model [9]. Individual components have infor-
mation about the overall system integration embedded into them. This may include 
embedding technical information about the sources of specific information (e.g., Con-
trol Area Network (CAN) IDs) or the reliance of components on information about in-
ternal states of other components. Consequentially, the overall system architecture 
becomes difficult to update and to reconfigure after completion of the engineering pro-
cess. As system integration information is leaked into individual components, updating, 
replacing, or reconfiguring specific parts of the system quickly requires updating many 
components. Furthermore, due to the often unclear functional interdependence be-
tween components – residing in the heads of engineers and in design documents ra-
ther than the software itself – foreseeing all consequences of updates and system 
reconfigurations becomes even harder [10]. 
These unforeseeable consequences do not necessarily pose a problem for current 
road vehicles, as updates rarely add new functions, with Tesla being a notable excep-
tion. We argue that the ability to update the software architecture becomes critical for 
the implementation of future automated and connected vehicles. For automated vehi-
cles, updatability allows vehicles that have been produced and shipped to customers 
to always operate using the state-of-the art techniques in perception and control. This 
is especially important from a safety perspective, as passenger’s safety in automated 
vehicles is even more in the hands of the software. The aspect of safe updates of 
vehicle functions after vehicle deployment was a central research focus of the project 
Controlling Concurrent Change [11] and will only gain relevance in the future. 
The ASOA has been devised around several core objectives that allow for updatability 
of the software architecture. Following a service-oriented approach (SOA), the funda-
mental building blocks are modular services that are dynamically integrated at runtime. 
Dynamic integration means that the interplay between individual services is decided at 
runtime. For example, as the current vehicle speed may be required by a service, the 
specific service providing the vehicle speed signal is not hard-coded but instead se-
lected at runtime. For this purpose, ASOA services follow a unified specification ap-
proach for requested and offered interfaces. This information constitutes the digital 
datasheet of a service. As service interfaces are explicitly announced and discovered 
at runtime, clear insight into functional interdependence is achieved. Due to the runtime 
integration and the interface concept, services themselves and, thus, the overall soft-
ware architecture become modular. 
The Orchestrator is a designated architecture component in ASOA and is the only el-
ement that can control the integration between individual services. Among others, the 
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Orchestrator has mechanisms to change integration between services by linking inter-
faces and has the ability to activate and deactivate services. The Orchestrator itself 
tightly integrates with the operating mode management. While services themselves are 
kept modular, the operating mode management is the central entity that controls the 
current mode of operation. This entity bundles global knowledge about the different 
operating modes, the intended system integration in each operating mode as well as 
the transition between modes of operation. The operating mode management uses the 
mechanisms offered by the Orchestrator to establish the intended mode of operation. 
More specifically, the Orchestrator offers an Application Programming Interface (API) 
that allows to link service interfaces, to control the lifecycle of individual services, and 
to determine service liveliness.  
In the design process of the services in UNICARagil, specific attention was paid to 
avoid exposing global state information to individual services. A simple example for 
this is the door management service. For the door management to determine whether 
it is safe to open the door, it is insufficient to decide simply based on the vehicle’s 
motion. The vehicle may be stopped because it is waiting at a red light or because the 
vehicle reached its destination. In a naive approach, the door management service 
would have to explicitly know about internal states of services that may only be avail-
able in specific vehicle variants. This in turn makes the door management service hard 
to use in other contexts. In our approach, the decision whether it is safe to open the 
door or not is not made in the door management service, but on the level of the oper-
ating mode management. Here, all necessary information is available without having 
to pollute the door management service with global state information. Thus, the door 
management becomes a modular service that offers a simple interfaces to control the 
vehicle door and is seamlessly reusable across different vehicle variants. 
Our approach contrasts with prevalent architectures, where individual components re-
quire knowledge about the overall system state. Knowledge about the system’s blue-
print and the individual building blocks constituting the system is clearly separated. We 
argue that this approach has various advantages. First, individual services can be re-
used in different vehicle variants and contexts that have different operating modes. 
Second, changing the system’s blueprint can be done in a more agile manner, as indi-
vidual services do not have to be modified to be used in different operating modes. 
This is especially important for keeping up with short technology lifecycles. If the mode 
of operation was embedded in each individual service, adding new modes of operation 
would require updating all services that rely on knowledge about the global system 
state. Our approach contributes to the overall updatability of the software architecture 
and allows us to handle agility in the UNICARagil project. Finally, through the strict 
separation of concerns, overall system modularity is facilitated. 
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4 Operating mode management 
To illustrate the operating mode management, we will first give an overview of the 
different operating modes of the UNICARagil vehicles and explain their use. After-
wards, we will elaborate how the operating mode management functions and illustrate 
this at an example. 
4.1 The operating modes of the UNICARagil vehicles 
As stated above, the UNICARagil vehicles can be operated in four different operating 
modes regarding the driving task: automated operation, control center operation, safe 
halt, and manual operation. Automated operation is the default operating mode. In this 
mode, the dynamic driving task is performed fully by the vehicle’s automated driving 
system. All monitoring tasks are performed by the vehicle as well as non-driving related 
tasks. 
In order to facilitate automated operation, all services required for automated guidance 
must be active and all necessary interfaces must be connected properly. All systems 
must be operational and calibrations must be complete. 
Control center operation [12] is the second operating mode of the UNICARagil vehi-
cles. It allows a vehicle to be controlled via teleoperation. Teleoperation is realized in 
different forms. A trajectory generated by the control room can be transmitted to the 
vehicle and realized by the vehicle’s trajectory controller. Alternatively, low-level driving 
commands can be submitted to the vehicle and realized directly by the vehicle’s dy-
namic modules (a combination of wheel hub motor, steering system, and brake sys-
tem, c.f. [12]). Manipulation of environment perception data was also considered but 
not realized within the project UNICARagil, e.g., to reclassify an object in the vehicle’s 
path if the object was misclassified by the vehicle’s perception system. The addition of 
a control center can enhance availability of an automated vehicle by increasing the 
number of situations an automated vehicle can handle as unforeseeable events will 
always happen in an open world. Germany's draft law “Act on Autonomous Driving” 
[13] designed to amend the Road Traffic Act also formulates the need for a control 
center for vehicles in which no human driver is present.  
In order to operate a vehicle remotely from the control center, a connection between 
vehicle and control center must be established. The vehicle’s perception data must be 
rerouted to the control center for the human operator in the control center to assess 
the current situation of and around the vehicle. Depending on the teleoperation mode, 
the vehicle must be reconfigured to accept control inputs from the control center. 
In case the vehicle encounters major system degradation, safe halt mode is activated. 
In safe halt mode, the vehicle transitions to a minimal risk condition by performing a 
minimal risk maneuver [2], [14]. The detection of such a degradation is part of a self-
perception system. Self-perception describes the counterpart to environment percep-
tion. While environment perception provides information on the environment external 
to the vehicle, self-perception provides information on the internal state of the vehicle 
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[15]. In case of the UNICARagil vehicles, the minimal risk condition is basically a stand-
still at an appropriate location. The vehicles are designed for urban environment where 
stopping the vehicle at the side of the road outside of intersections or other high-traffic 
areas can be considered reasonably safe in most cases even when the passengers 
have to exit the vehicle. This may not be the case for automated vehicles operated on 
a highway where stopping on the shoulder of the road may be the minimal risk condi-
tion, but cannot generally be considered to maintain the safe state [2].  
The needs of different groups of passengers of an automated vehicle and the resulting 
requirements of these passengers in case of an unplanned safe halt are discussed in 
[16]. 
Once safe halt mode is activated, the control center is alerted. When the minimal risk 
condition has been reached, the control center is required to take action. As safe halt 
mode is only activated when the regular automated driving function is unable to safely 
fulfill the driving task any longer, an assessment of the degradation by an external 
operator in a control center is indispensable. Depending on the system degradation of 
the vehicle, support provided by the control center can take different forms. If the sys-
tem degradation was only temporary, acknowledging safe halt activation and triggering 
a transition back into automated operation can be sufficient. If the present degradation 
makes it impossible to proceed the trip, but slow teleoperation is still possible, the con-
trol center operator can also request control of the vehicle in order to move the vehicle 
to a more appropriate location. Finally, the remote operator can send assistance to the 
vehicle if control via teleoperation is not possible. 
Safe halt mode and its accordingly activated safe halt function are safety fallbacks. 
Thus, transition into safe halt mode does not depend on the fulfillment of any conditions 
and should be available permanently during operation time. In the UNICARagil 
vehicles, the safe halt function uses a sensor setup redundant to and independent from 
the sensor modules at the four corners of the vehicles [1], [12]. This redundant sensor 
setup is used to check for objects in the immediate path of the vehicle. Its function is 
intentionally kept simple to minimize complexity in the safety fallback. Safe halt should 
be used sparingly and only in emergencies due to this minimal sensor setup and 
reduced functionality of the safe halt function compared to the regular automated 
driving function [14]. 
The last operating mode is manual operation. Automated vehicles also infrequently 
need to be moved in distinct environments outside of the road network and common 
parking grounds. One example is to undergo maintenance as any other vehicle. Here, 
it may become necessary to manually move the vehicle in a workshop. It is not practical 
to include this use-case in the automated driving system as it is rare and would have 
to cover a large variety of situations. Therefore, manual operation was included as an 
operating mode for the UNICARagil vehicles in order to move a vehicle at very low 
speed for maintenance purposes in a workshop.  
The UNICARagil vehicles are designed without any manual control inputs for a driver. 
Thus, in order to activate manual operation, manual control elements must be con-
nected to input sockets provided for this purpose. While these control elements are 
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connected, automated operation is not possible. In addition to the manual control ele-
ments, services that translate manual control inputs into actuator commands must be 
activated. 
4.2 Switching between Operating Modes 
Connections and transitions between the operating modes described in the previous 
section are illustrated in Fig. 3. Transitions between modes always take place in stand-
still for safety reasons. The only exception to this are transitions into safe halt mode, 
as this mode encapsulates the safety fallback of the automated driving system. 
After startup, the vehicle enters a boot-up state ①, Boot-Up is one of several so called 
transition states in order to connect the operating mode management with 
UNICARagil’s Automotive Service-oriented Software Architecture (ASOA) [3]. Within 
these transition states, the service orchestration takes place. Thus, necessary services 
are activated, service interfaces are linked, and conditions for transitioning into one of 
the operating modes are evaluated. In case service orchestration is unsuccessful, the 
operating mode management transitions back into the previous operating mode and 
another mode change can be initiated. 
In the boot-up state, all necessary services for automated operation are started, inputs 
and outputs are connected, and system calibrations are carried out. If no manual con-
trol elements are connected to the vehicle and all conditions for automated operation 
are fulfilled, the operating mode management transitions (a) into automated operating 
mode ⑤. If any manual control elements are connected to the vehicle, the operating 
mode management initiates the transition (b) into manual operating mode ③. Another 
transition state ② may be necessary as all services are configured for automated op-
eration during boot-up and may have to be reconfigured to accept inputs from the man-
ual control elements.  
The removal of all manual control elements triggers the transition (d) into automated 
operation ⑤. Again, a transition state ④ is necessary similar to the boot-up state to 
start all required services, connect services with each other, and check whether all 
conditions for a transition (e) into automated operation are fulfilled. 
From automated operation ⑤, a transition (g) into control center operation ⑦ can be 
triggered, e.g., when the vehicle cannot resolve a situation on its own. As the control 
center requires access to the vehicle’s perception data, a reconfiguration of the per-
ception system may be necessary. Additional services are started in a transition state 
⑥ for connecting the vehicle directly to the control center, for sending data to the con-
trol center, and for receiving data from the control center. Depending on the method of 
teleoperation, services for trajectory control or actuator control are reconfigured to re-
ceive input from the control center. 
Transitioning (i) back to automated operation ④ from control center operation requires 
all the aforementioned reconfigurations to be reversed. The perception system must 
be reconfigured for automated operation, all control inputs must be reconnected to the 
vehicle’s internal trajectory planner or trajectory controller. All services for connecting 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202110271613-0
604  30th Aachen Colloquium Sustainable Mobility 2021 
with the control center must be stopped and the connection to the control center must 
be terminated. 
 
Fig. 3 Overview of operating modes and mode transitions. 
From automated operation as well as from control center operation, transitioning via 
(k) and (m), to safe halt mode ⑧ is possible without any transition state. As stated 
above, in safe halt mode, the safe halt function is activated which acts as the fallback 
for the automated driving system. This transition is only activated when major system 
degradation occurs. Thus, it is essential that a transition into safe halt mode is fast and 
not delayed by any transition state or conditions. Transitioning back to automated op-
eration from safe halt mode is only possible via control center operation. As a major 
system degradation occurred it is necessary that the reason for this degradation is 
assessed before automated operation is continued. 
When the vehicle shall be turned off, the transition state Shut-Down ⑨ is entered (o), 
(p), (q), (r). This transition state allows for all services to be stopped and all systems to 
be shut-down orderly before power to the systems is disconnected. 
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5 Implementation 
This section provides details on the implementation of the operating mode manage-
ment and its integration with ASOA and the Orchestrator. 
As describe before, the operating mode management is an automaton consisting  
of states that are linked with transitions. Transitions are executed if Boolean-value 
guard conditions are true. When executing a transition or when entering a state,  
the automaton may invoke specific functions offered by the Orchestrator. For  
UNICARagil, we use MATLAB Stateflow for implementation of the operating mode 
management, as it has all features required for implementing automata as described 
above. Guards and actions that interact with the Orchestrator and ASOA are functions 
implemented using C language, which can be directly invoked from Stateflow. The 
complete operation mode management for all four vehicle variants resides in a single 
MATLAB Stateflow chart. We use the MATLAB code generator to create a binary that 
can be directly deployed to the UNICARagil vehicles and git for version control. The 
deployment and code generation process is automated using continuous integration 
(CI). Upon changing the operation mode management, the CI pipeline automatically 
generates a binary that is ready to run on the target platform. For debugging and de-
velopment purposes, the model can also be executed in the MATLAB environment.  
 
Fig. 4 ASAO implementation example for a simplified mode change. 
A simplified example for such a mode change is depicted in Fig. 4. Here, the operating 
mode management is currently in mode 𝑀 . The only outbound transition from 𝑀  leads 
to 𝑀 , but is only executed if the guard condition becomes true. The guard condition 
here is implemented as the C function vehicleInStandstill(), which evaluates 
true if the vehicle is not in motion. Once this condition becomes true, a sequence of 
commands (connectService, stopService, startService) is issued using the 
Orchestrator. These actions change the set of active services and the integration 
among them. The orchestrator commands are received and handled internally by the 
services and are invisible to the developer of the service. First, the output of service 𝑆  
is linked to the input of service 𝑆 . Then, service 𝑆  is stopped and service 𝑆  is started. 
The operating mode management has now transitioned to mode 𝑀 . Note that through 
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the decoupling of individual services from knowledge about the overall system integra-
tion, services do not have to be aware of the higher-level operating mode management. 
Thus, services become reusable in other contexts and adding or changing the system 
integration behavior does necessarily require updates of individual services. 
6 Example 
In the following, we will illustrate the mechanisms described above at an example. The 
example is a fallback to safe halt from automated operation, resolved by the control 
center with subsequent continuation of the trip. 
 
Fig. 5 Overview of operating modes and transitions with example bolded. 
6.1 Transition from automated operation into safe halt mode 
We will begin the example with the system in the operating mode automated operation, 
as it is the default operating mode the vehicle will reside in the majority of the time. 
From automated operation, a transition into safe halt mode is only triggered as a last 
resort. As stated in Section 4, a transition into safe halt mode and the connected safe 
halt functionality is only triggered when a severe degradation occurs and the auto-
mated driving function active in automated operating mode is not able to safely fulfill 
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the driving task any longer. Such a degradation can be caused by, e.g. a severe sensor 
degradation, loss of essential ECUs, or degradation or loss of other essential services 
or components.  
Information provided by the vehicle’s self-perception is used in the operating mode 
management in the transitional condition to trigger a transition into safe halt mode and 
activate the safe halt function, which performs a minimal risk maneuver in order to 
reach a minimal risk condition [2], [14]. The safe halt function is realized as a service 
in hot standby that is constantly provided an emergency path by the trajectory planner 
of the main automated driving function. This path is constantly transformed into a tra-
jectory by the safe halt function and sent to the trajectory controller.  
 
Fig. 6 Transition from automated operation into safe halt mode. 
For any transition except the transition into safe halt mode, the Orchestrator reconfig-
ures the service configuration of the vehicle. The transition into safe halt mode, how-
ever, has to be instantaneous. A reconfiguration would potentially take too much time 
in case of a severe degradation. For this reason, both the regular trajectory as well as 
the safe halt trajectory are sent to the trajectory controller and the Orchestrator utilizes 
its functionality to directly manipulate service interfaces to set which trajectory shall be 
used as input by the controller. This way, the service is kept unaware of the vehicle’s 
operating mode. It must simply be designed with the two trajectory inputs and a way 
for the Orchestrator to set the active interface.  
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6.2 Transition from safe halt mode into control center operation 
 
Fig. 7 Transition from safe halt mode into control center operation. 
Once the vehicle has come to a standstill, the control center has to take action as any 
degradation severe enough to trigger the safety fallback must be assessed by a human 
operator. The control center is alerted that the safety fallback was triggered in a vehicle 
of the monitored fleet upon activation of the transition into safe halt mode. When a 
standstill has been reached (in the planned halt location or elsewhere), and the reach-
ing of this state has been communicated to the operating mode management, a tran-
sition into control center operation can be initiated. As a service reconfiguration is 
necessary for the control center to take over responsibility for the dynamic driving task, 
a transitional state is entered to coordinate this reconfiguration by the Orchestrator. In 
order for the control center to get access to the vehicle, the active service configuration 
has to be reconfigured. Services have to be started to transmit data from the vehicles 
to the control center and to receive data from control center so the vehicle can be 
moved remotely. Additionally, sensors may have to be reconfigured to adjust the sen-
sor data for transmission. 
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And of course interfaces of services providing the (preprocessed) sensor data must be 
connected to services for sensor data transmission to the control center. Based on the 
environment perception data received directly from the vehicle and the self-perception 
data of the vehicle that is regularly transmitted to and stored in the cloud [12] an oper-
ator in the control center will assess the problem that occurred. 
The control center operator has several options of assisting the vehicle and its pas-
sengers. The operator can open a communication channel to the vehicle to communi-
cate with the passengers, reassure, and assist them. This is especially important when 
children or people reliant on assistance travel in the vehicle. If the problem that oc-
curred with the vehicle is severe and not resolvable by the operator, they can initiate 
having the vehicle towed to a workshop or maintenance facility and the passengers to 
be picked up by another vehicle. Otherwise, the operator has several options to resolve 
the occurred problem. If the problem was only temporary and has disappeared after 
the activation of the safety fallback, the operator can simply acknowledge it and thereby 
initiate a retransition into automated operation. If the problem appears to be location-
specific (e.g., temporary degradation of localization accuracy due to environmental fac-
tors such as tree cover or high buildings), the operator can attempt to resolve the prob-
lem by moving the vehicle to a different location. In order to do this, they have two 
possibilities. They can request teleoperation via trajectory control or via direct control. 
Depending on the selected teleoperation mode, services in the vehicle have to be re-
configured differently. For teleoperation via trajectory control, the service that receives 
data from the control center has to be connected to the trajectory controller in the ve-
hicle while other inputs to the trajectory controller must be disconnected. For teleoper-
ation via direct control, the service receiving data from the control center is connected 
to the motion controller for direct control on the vehicle that will translate input from the 
control center into command for the dynamic modules of the vehicle. Additionally, an 
emergency trajectory will be generated by the control center and send to the vehicle to 
ensure that a transition into safe halt mode and an activation of the safe halt function 
can still be triggered. 
If the problem of the vehicle could be resolved by moving the vehicle to a different 
location via teleoperation, the operator in the control center will acknowledge the prob-
lem as resolved and thereby initiate a retransmission into automated operation. Tele-
operation may also be used to move the vehicle to a more appropriate location after a 
safe halt when the location the vehicle stopped at was not ideally planned by the guid-
ance system and the vehicle is still operable by the control center. 
6.3 Transition from control center operation to automated operation 
If the problem that occurred with the vehicle could be resolved by the control center, 
the control center operator initiates a transition back to automated operation mode. 
Again, a reconfiguration of the service configuration of the vehicle is necessary. A tran-
sitional state is entered to coordinate this reconfiguration.  
In this transitional state, the connection to the control center is terminated and all ser-
vices not needed for automated operation are stopped such as services to communi-
cate data to and from the control center. Services for sensor data processing are 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-202110271613-0
610  30th Aachen Colloquium Sustainable Mobility 2021 
reconfigured again to provide data in the appropriate format for environment perception 
services rather than a control center operator. Services for sensor data processing are 
reconnected to the respective environment perception services. Additionally, service 
interfaces of the trajectory controller are reconnected to the trajectory generation on 
the vehicle. Once the service reconfiguration was successful and all transitional con-
ditions are fulfilled, the operating mode management transitions the vehicle into auto-
mated operation and the responsibility for the dynamic driving task lies with the 
vehicle’s automated driving system again. 
 
Fig. 8 Transition from control center operation to automated operation. 
7 Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper, we argued the need for an operating mode management as a central 
decision unit for a vehicle with multiple operating modes and with the need for the 
coordination of non-driving related task. We demonstrated the operating mode man-
agement at the example of the operating mode management realized in the project 
UNICARagil. It coordinates four different operating modes and the associated alloca-
tion of the responsibility for the dynamic driving task. Additionally, an operating mode 
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management is needed as a central entity to coordinate non-driving related task such 
as the control of an automatic door system. We presented the interaction of such an 
operating mode management with ASOA the Service-oriented Software Architecture. 
We showed its coupling with ASOA’s Orchestrator as an architecture component for 
service discovery and orchestration and argued the contribution to a system’s modu-
larity by keeping the system’s operating mode separate of the service implementation.  
This operating mode management will be implemented and integrated into the four 
prototypes and demonstrated in operation. It will provide a valuable contribution to the 
overall concept of modularity pursued in the project UNICARagil. 
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